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attacking British policy on Greece. 27 Trade union reactions were also strong. The general executive council of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU), meeting on 6
December, said that it was 'deeply concerned at the grave situation' in Greece, and called for free elections to be held as soon as possible. 28 On 11 December, the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) 'register [ed] an emphatic protest' against British policy, which, it said, would prove 'disastrous' to both the war effort and the future of Greece. 29 All this might not have mattered so much, had it not been for the fact that the Labour party's annual conference was due to convene on Monday 11 December. There was a rich irony here.
The conference should have met in May. However, the government had requested that where possible such meetings should be postponed, to reduce the amount of rail and road traffic in southern England so that preparations for D-Day could proceed apace. Labour party leaders and managers, who had been fearing a strong challenge to the electoral truce, had accepted postponement with alacrity. 30 Now, however, they faced an even stronger challenge on an issue that would not have registered earlier in the year. As they arrived in London over the weekend of 9-10 December, all the major trade union delegations had private discussions about Greece. 31 As the conference convened, CLPs were still passing resolutions strongly critical of British policy. 32 On Wednesday, 13 December, the conference was due to debate
Greece. The conference arrangements committee (CAC) received a number of very strongly worded resolutions. Among these were motions from major unions such as the TGWU and the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR). However, it was decided by the CAC, in consultation with the party's national executive committee (NEC) , that none of these resolutions would be taken. Instead, debate would centre on an NEC resolution which turned out to be a masterpiece of understatement: as the acting chairman of the party conference,
Harold Laski, later put it, it did not have 'a single adjective in it'. 33 The resolution 'deeply regret[ted] the tragic situation which ha [d] arisen in Greece' and asked the British government to do its utmost to secure an immediate armistice and the resumption of talks between all the various resistance groups, 'with a view to the establishment of a provisional national Government, which would proceed to a free and fair General Election as soon as practicable'.
It also looked forward to 'the establishment of a strong democratic system which will bring peace, happiness, and reconciliation to our generous and heroic Greek Allies'. No amendments were allowed, and in the event the resolution was passed by the huge majority (2,455,000 votes to 137,000) -after all, it was so pious and well meaning that it was difficult to oppose it. 34 The debate did not pass without controversy, even so. The railwaymen, in particular, Party'. 36 It was significant that neither Benstead nor Plover was on the left, still less a fellowtraveller -they were, in fact, both right wingers. They clearly feared that, unless the leadership did something to help them by differentiating themselves from Churchill's policy, they would come under very strong pressure from the left in their respective unions. 37 In reply, Bevin stressed that he, like all other Labour ministers, was committed to government policy in all areas, and emphasized that 'if we win at the next General Election, as I hope we shall, we shall find that we cannot govern this world by emotionalism, it will call for hard thinking and great decisions, tremendous will power will have to be applied, and the Labour Movement will have to learn to ride the storms of life as these great issues arise from time to time'. 38 This was a powerful performance, but it called forth some criticism, especially from Aneurin Bevan, who attacked Bevin for an account of events in Greece that had been 'garbled and inadequate where it is not unveracious', and who had lined up with the only three other bodies in the world to have supported British actions, 'namely, Fascist Spain, Fascist
Portugal, and the majority of the Tories in the House of Commons'. While stressing that he did not wish to break up the Coalition, Bevan also argued that Labour ministers should try to 'exercise a more decisive influence upon the conduct of our affairs or else leave the Tories to do their own dirty work themselves'. The alternative was for Labour to become utterly compromised by the time of the election, to such an extent that it would be unable to put forward any independent critique of reactionary policies. 39 The executive's choice of the popular miners' MP, James Griffiths, to reply to the debate showed that it was nervous as to the extent to which the centre, as well as the left, of the party might be influenced by such criticism. The fact that Bevan had, the previous day, been elected as a constituency party representative to the NEC at his first attempt, suggested that old methods like threats of expulsion were no longer appropriate where he was concerned. 40 It is hard to believe that he was not helped in gaining last-minute support by his strong attacks over Greece prior to the conference.
The annual conference resolution was intended as a means of uniting the party behind the leadership. In a few cases, it worked, as when the South Wales Regional Council of Labour supported it on 18 December. 41 But in the South Wales town of Pontypridd that very same day, the MP, Arthur Pearson (very much a leadership loyalist), was given a rough ride by his constituency party when he tried a similar tack. He argued that the situation in Greece was being brought under control, and that he could not wholly condemn the government's action because 'it had been a Cabinet decision and Attle [sic], Morrison and Bevin had had a share in it'. But this failed to convince members of his party, who voted to send a strongly-worded resolution attacking the government to the Foreign Office. 42 On the same day, Stafford CLP passed a resolution condemning government policy on 'the liberated countries, particularly
Greece' as in 'direct contradiction' of the aim of 'free[ing] the world from Fascism and Nazism', and 'a needless sacrifice of human lives'. 43 Before the end of the year, there were also strongly-worded resolutions from Rotherham, Sheffield Brightside, Liverpool TCLP, and Greenwich. 44 Even the Labour peers put forward a motion in the House of Lords on 21
December regretting British policy and attacking 'military action against our Greek allies' as 'shameful'. 45 The first two weeks of January saw a continuation of the process. On 4 January, the national committee of the Co-operative party, which was close to Labour, adopted a resolution criticising British policy, calling for concerted action between the Allies, and condemning Churchill's 'abusive references to the character of ELAS'. 46 reprobate the massing and the leading of large numbers of unarmed children to a demonstration, the scene of which had been banned by the Government, in a city full of armed men and liable at any moment to an explosion.
Pethick-Lawrence later returned to try to wring some kind of statement from Churchill that he could use to pacify his increasingly angry MPs, saying that the British government should in future make its support for the Greek government conditional on the latter's adoption of 'a conciliatory attitude' towards all its people. Churchill's reply was again less than diplomatic:
'Oh, yes certainly, a conciliatory policy, but that should not include running away from, or lying down under, the threat of armed revolution or violence'. 63 His language in the debate of we have had to arm anyone who could shoot a Hun'; and proudly confirming that in 1928 he had supported Mussolini 'in the sense of making speeches to say that it was a very good thing that Italy was not plunged into Bolshevism'. 64 None of this was likely to silence his critics;
indeed, it aroused fierce Labour protest. 65 Nor did it make the Labour leadership's job of party management any easier: but then again, it was not calculated to do so. As the exasperated Greenwood said, Churchill seemed to be 'fomenting ideological differences inside his own Government'. 66 Churchill himself subsequently admitted that, at times, such as in his 4.50 a.m. telegram to Scobie on 5 December, his tone was 'somewhat strident'. Although he sought to defend this on the grounds that a strong lead was needed, it is hard to avoid the view that the effect was not entirely the result of sober calculation. 67 He had been unwell: in early September 1944 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who saw him frequently at close quarters, felt that the premier was 'very definitely ill' and was 'doubtful how much longer he will last', adding that had come as 'a nasty shock to the allied commanders and publics', and contingency planning in late November for the war 'dragging on late into 1945' was hardly likely to improve the premier's mood. 69 The V-1 and V-2 attacks on London and the South-East were causing real concern within the highest echelons of government, and the fact that casualty figures were being kept a closely guarded secret demonstrates ministers' anxiety. 70 Churchill was also, without doubt, needled by American criticism of events in Syntagma Square. 71 But domestic criticism, especially from erstwhile Establishment newspapers like The Times, vexed him further. 72 As Greece became more and more of a preoccupation during December, Churchill himself became increasingly overwrought and 'hopelessly overtired'. 73 Finally, he was undoubtedly upset that Labour's NEC had, on 7 October, issued a statement to the effect that at the post-war general election Labour would 'go before the country with a practical policy based upon … Socialist principles … and … invite the electors to return a majority pledged to support a Labour Government to implement that policy'; this declaration of impending independence was endorsed by the party's annual conference on 11 December. 74 This would mean an end to the Coalition and increased uncertainty as to the role that Churchill might find for himself in post-war politics. None of this was conducive towards him being conciliatory towards Labour.
There was more to it than vexation, however. It seems likely that there was an element of calculation in Churchill's attitude towards Labour at this point. He had long taken the view that the key issue was to win the war, and that post-war concerns would have to take care of themselves. This failure to engage with 'post-war' had never satisfied some Conservatives, and was convincing fewer and fewer as the end of the war approached. With the Conservative organization reviving by the end of 1944, Churchill was coming under increasing pressure to provide his party with a lead. It therefore seems likely that he was deliberately truculent with his Labour critics in order to push them into more extreme positions, to compromise themor rather to allow them to compromise themselves -by taking up positions that were so pro-ELAS that they would embarrass the party once the dust had settled in Athens. He also knew that, given the continuing commitment of the Labour leadership to the Coalition, this would open up all kinds of divisions within the Labour party.
Conversely, however, many Labour people also remained dubious as to the good faith of their leaders, particularly over the future of the Coalition government. There had been a significant level of Labour criticism of the electoral truce ever since it had been concluded in September 77 In parliament, Bevan was especially critical of DR1AA, and led a revolt against it. Twenty-five MPs opposed the government, sixteen of them Labour; of those sixteen, eight were to vote against the government on 8 December over
Greece. The remaining nine comprised many of those non-Labour leftists who would join Bevan and the others over Greece -for example, Acland, Driberg, Gallacher and McGovern.
For his role in the Labour rebellion, and more particularly for his attacks on trade union leaders who accepted the Regulation, Bevan was hauled over the coals by a joint meeting of the TUC general council, the NEC and the PLP, and almost expelled from the party. 78 Many Labour people simply did not believe that their leaders wished to leave the Coalition after the war, and feared that the party would be tied to a Coalition manifesto at any post-war election. In these circumstances, the idea that Labour ministers could be trusted on Greece was rather fanciful to some of the party's members. It was no coincidence that, on the very day after it debated Greece, the party conference rebelled against the NEC to pass, against the latter's advice, the proposal of Reading Labour party that the party's programme for the next election should include specific pledges to the nationalization of 'the land, large-scale building, heavy industry, and all forms of banking, transport and fuel and power', as well as the democratic control of 'national assets, services and industries' to include workers' and consumers' representation. 79 Many union delegations in particular, would have been mandated in advance to support the resolution. But the furore over Greece the previous day probably helped the resolution to be passed, first by swaying those delegates who were not so mandated, and secondly, by hardening the resistance of delegates, mandated or not, to the NEC's pleas that the resolution should be remitted to it for further consideration. As Stephen The Mosley release provided a symbol and a focus for these anxieties, crystallising all that was most disturbing in private feeling and allowing it public expression.' It also noted that '[q]ualitatively, the outburst of feeling which preceded and followed the release [of Mosley]
was probably the strongest which Mass-Observation has encountered in seven years' work'. 86 Morrison's refusal thereafter to answer questions about the chances of Mosley's reinternment, or to release details of the conditions under which he was kept under a form of house arrest, only served to increase irritation. 87 Had this been an isolated event, its impact might have been less. But it came in the context of continuing pressure against DR18B. In retrospect, of course, it could be argued that internment without proper trial hardly chimed in with the principles of liberty and the rule of law for which Britain claimed to be fighting. 88 Mass-Observation found in 1944 that the powers given to the authorities by the Regulation had 'never been really accepted by more than a very narrow majority' of the population. 89 There was, certainly, considerable sniping at press the notion of 'progressive unity' hard, as 'a good thing' in itself and, in some cases, because they argued that they could not otherwise see any way of defeating the Conservatives at the post-war general election. Common Wealth was also pressing for some form of unity.
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The party leadership, and the NEC in particular, maintained a wall of opposition to such talk. 101 However, issues continued to arise which put the matter back on the political agenda:
one which was much exercising the party by the latter part of 1944 was the application of the fellow-travelling MP D. N. Pritt for readmission to the Labour party, talks about which were progressing throughout the period of Labour's crisis over Greece. 102 The AEU, although not under Communist control, was pressing hard for 'progressive unity', and although, for the time being, it was prepared to do so within the party's rules and to eschew formal links with the CPGB, there were always concerns as to whether it might at some stage 'break out' into a more combative line. 103 
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(Significantly, the latter was rescinded -on the grounds that it was against Labour party rules -at the next meeting, which was held after the conclusion of the January truce in Greece.) 109 Although Rotherham is unusual in allowing us to chart all its concerns so closely, it was clearly not untypical of the wider Labour movement's attitudes at this time. 112 Stafford CLP refused to be placated by headquarters reassurances even after the January truce had been agreed, criticising the use of British forces 'against the friends of democracy'. 113 For others, though, there was no followup to the first resolution, suggesting that interest was short lived. 114 A month after Pontypridd TCLP had passed its resolution strongly critical of government policy, for example, its chairman was expressing his disappointment at the TCLP's failure to conduct any real propaganda about Greece. 115 By the second half of January, for most Labour parties, the issue was disappearing, or at least retreating, quite rapidly: on 20 January Wolverhampton Bilston passed a resolution congratulating the party nationally on its stance on Greece, implying that the crisis had been overcome, not least thanks to Labour itself. 116 On the same day, Walthamstow borough Labour party treated a resolution received from a trade union branch regarding Greece as being, effectively, out of date. 117 Halifax CLP continued to record interest later than most: on 8 February, its executive committee agreed to draft a resolution to be discussed by its annual meeting on 22 February. However, the Varkiza agreement of 12
February appeared to render any such resolution otiose, and none was discussed at the annual meeting. 118 Why did the crisis die down? The most obvious answer is that the situation in Greece itself changed. The appointment of the Regent removed the fear that Churchill would try to restore the King before a plebiscite could be held on the future of the monarchy. Damaskinos's appointment of Plastiras was seen by some Labour people as a provocation, but the conclusion of a truce between his government and EAM/ELAS on 11 January -just eight days after his appointment to the premiership -seemed to suggest to others that there was nothing inherently and incurably repulsive about the new regime. Over the following month, Greece moved towards the Varkiza agreement, which seemed to offer some hope of a more permanent settlement.
With the core issue fading away, the peripheral elements that had coalesced with it to intensify Labour's Greek crisis began to disperse. One important factor here was an easing of relations with Churchill. On the day before the 11 January truce, the NEC discussed Greece at length. Bevan played a leading role, and Shinwell proposed a resolution for publication, to the effect that unless EAM was included in the Greek government, Britain should withdraw its troops immediately. However, Hugh Dalton was able to show that Shinwell's motion went beyond the party conference resolution, and instead secured a vote of 11 to 6 in favour of sending a deputation to see Churchill to discuss the matter further. 119 By now, Churchill felt that he had his critics on the run, given the favourable turn of events in Athens, and his initial reaction appears to have been negative. 120 A combative draft reply to Morgan Phillips, the Labour party secretary, continued the political points scoring of the last month, with references to 'the Communist conspirators and their dupes' whose attacks had been a major burden to the government at 'a critical stage in the war'. 121 However, the reply appears to have been held back pending approval from the war cabinet, which met later that day. The meeting was a long and difficult one, and covered a wide range of serious foreign policy problems. 122 Ultimately it was agreed that Churchill should see the Labour delegation, on the understanding that he would not be expected to go into detail on the position in Greece. 123 Labour members of the war cabinet were certainly acting in tandem with Dalton here, and made a crucial difference. It seems likely that, for all his triumphalism, Churchill was persuaded that the situation remained potentially difficult, and that there was now more than ever a need to ensure broad support for British policy in Greece: in short, the search for party advantage would have to be put to one side, for the time being at any rate.
The delegation, comprising Greenwood (chairman of the PLP), Laski (acting party chairman),
Griffiths and Bevan, with Phillips also in attendance, visited Downing Street at 3 p.m. on Monday 15 January. Careful planning was required by Number 10 staff: Churchill demanded that the delegation should all be seated prior to his entry, so that he would not have to shake hands with Bevan. 124 Greenwood introduced the discussion, but otherwise said little, leaving
Laski, Bevan and Griffiths to make statements in turn before Churchill came in at the end. A number of themes emerged from the comments of the Labour speakers. One was to emphasize to Churchill the extent of Labour's difficulties with the wider party over the issue.
There had been no shortage of efforts to control the problem; the fact was that it was very hard to contain the pressure that had built up. Second, concern was expressed about the bona fides of the various trade union leaders who were now emerging in Greece and claiming that they had the right to speak for non-Communist workers. As Laski said, some of these appeared to have had good relations with the Metaxas regime, and as he said to Churchill, 'I am sure you will forgive us if we feel a certain lack of enthusiasm for Fascist trade unions'.
Some fears were expressed about Plastiras, although Churchill was at pains to emphasize that the Regent remained in control. 125 But common ground was also found. There was, for example, all-round condemnation of hostage taking by EAM/ELAS. As the meeting continued, relations warmed. Where Churchill had previously been provocative, he was now somewhat more conciliatory. There was even some banter: when Laski tried to reassure Churchill that the NEC had not tried to increase his difficulties, the premier replied: 'I hope you will not ask me for a certificate', to which Laski's response was: 'I shall be in very great danger if I received [sic] a certificate'.
Churchill declared his total support for 'full fair, free, universal suffrage, the secret ballot, no intimidation, full discussion; nobody can hustle me off that'. The meeting closed, notably, with an anti-American consensus. When Churchill denounced criticism over Greece from the Americans, who, he claimed, 'take no responsibility in these matters, who, instead of wishing to come and share the burden of the difficulties, find it much easier to stand on the bank on the other side if the thing goes right; if it goes wrong they come in and criticise', Bevan responded eagerly that Labour had 'rebuked the American Administration for its conduct', 26 while Laski commented tartly that 'specialising in moral declarations is one of the characteristics of the United States'. Finally, they agreed an anodyne public statement, which said only that they had met and had a 'full and frank discussion' on Greece. 126 The meeting had been a success: Churchill felt able to tell the war cabinet later that day that the discussion had been 'very friendly', that the points raised by the Labour members had been 'very minor'
and that he had reassured them that free elections were the desired outcome so far as the government was concerned. 127 The next day, after hearing Laski and Griffiths report back to the Labour party's International Sub-Committee, Dalton felt that Churchill had 'captivated and, to a considerable extent, persuaded them'. 128 One suggestion that had emerged in the meeting between Churchill and the Labour delegation was that a Labour party fact-finding mission should be sent to Greece, in order to establish the credentials of union leaders and also simply to make contact with those of like mind.
Churchill had rejected the idea on the grounds that it must include all parties or none, but had added that he had been thinking of appointing 'a trade union delegation of a non-party character'. 129 He had in fact been considering such a deputation for a few days, and had suggested it to the general secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) Sir Walter Citrine, on 12 January. 130 After initial reluctance, Citrine decided to go, forming a TUC delegation which also included Benstead of the NUR, George Bagnall of the Wool Textile Workers, and George Chester of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (NUBSO). Of course, this was anything but a truly 'non-party' delegation. Given the close links between the TUC and the Labour party, there could be no doubt that whatever Citrine and his colleagues produced would be intended to play mainly to a Labour audience. Furthermore, Citrine was selected safe in the knowledge that he would be most likely to produce a report highly unfavourable to EAM/ELAS and broadly in line with British official thinking. A moderate of long standing, he had also developed a firm reputation as a 'commonsense' critic of communism abroad as well as at home. In 1935, he had travelled to the Soviet Union, and published on his return a highly critical account of the Soviet system, as a corrective to the writings of enthusiasts like 27 the Webbs. 131 In 1940, he had visited Finland while it was at war with the USSR, and had returned to write another book strongly critical of the Soviets. 132 He was therefore the obvious choice to lead the delegation to Greece.
Three days after Churchill's meeting with the Labour party delegation there began a two-day
House of Commons debate on the war situation and international policy: inevitably, Greece loomed large. Opening the debate, Churchill was still quite provocative, but was less truculent than he had been previously, although he was not slow to point out how the emergence of more and more information from Greece regarding ELAS's conduct was steadily weakening the position of the government's critics. 133 The speech, which lasted for more than two hours, was the best, 'rhetorically', that his private secretary, John Colville, had heard him make 'since 1941 or even 1940'. 134 Attlee wound up the first day's debate with a 'commonsense' type of speech, replete with racial stereotypes such as '[w]hen you are dealing with people like the Greeks, who are rather temperamental perhaps, … you should never try to judge them exactly on your own basis'. 135 Above all, he called for a distinction to be made between
Fascists and right-wingers: the former would not be acceptable in a Greek government, but the latter would, if the Greek people wanted them. 136 Acland moved a vote of censure on the government; but only seven votes were cast for it, as against 340 for the government. Only five of those seven -Cocks, Sloan, W. G. Cove, David Kirkwood, and Alfred Salter -were Labour MPs. The other two were the Communist, Gallacher, and the fellow traveller, Pritt (the two Common Wealth MPs, Acland and Hugh Lawson, acted as tellers). 137 There was not a sudden mass conversion of the December rebels to the government's position: of the 30
MPs who had opposed the government then, only one (the Independent, Eleanor Rathbone) now voted with the government. But the key point was that only 4 of the 23 Labour rebels in December now maintained their rebellion to the point of opposing the government in the division lobbies (Kirkwood had not voted on 8 December). Even Bevan, who made a powerful speech in which he did not stint at attacking one of the Prime Minister's claims as 'a grotesque piece of Churchillian rubbish' did not vote in the division. 138 His speech was far 28 less divisive of Labour than his previous effort, and drew strong praise, doubtless for this reason, from the loyalist Griffiths. 139 It is notable that Bevan's strong rhetoric was now directed firmly outside the Labour party, which was bound to improve his position vis-à-vis the party leadership. There was clearly a desire on the part of Labour MPs, aside from the handful of irreconcilables, to avoid division on the issue. The minuscule size of the vote for Acland's motion merely exposed the weakness of the government's parliamentary critics.
It only remained for Citrine to apply the coup de grâce. By now, most of mainstream Labour was prepared to accept the verdict that would be delivered by the TUC delegation to Greece.
The National Union of Mineworkers, although sorely troubled by events in Greece, agreed on 18 January not to act on a demand from its Scottish Area -where Communist influence was relatively strong -for immediate agitation on Greece, on the grounds that since their letter had been received, the Labour delegation had visited Churchill and the TUC delegation appointed to visit Greece. 140 As Jack Tinker, the long-serving, right-wing, Miners-sponsored The answers given by the soldiers confirmed beyond any doubt whatever, that there was a deep sense of grievance against certain sections of the British press, and particular Members of Parliament; that it was grotesque to describe what had taken place in Greece as the use of reluctant troops on the side of reaction against a democratic people; that practically all the ELAS forces were in civilian clothes, and it was almost impossible for our troops to tell who were civilians and who were not; that many women, and even nurses, had undoubtedly concealed and carried weapons;
that whilst there might have been isolated cases of reprisals by individual policemen, there was no evidence whatever of any organized or large scale reprisals; that both fear and intimidation were present among the Greek people, both before and after the fighting; that the oath alleged to have been sworn by every ELAS recruit did not correspond to the conduct shown by ELAS in the fighting; ELAS were the dirtiest fighters our troops had encountered.
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In particular, the idea much pressed by the left in December -that British soldiers who had volunteered to fight fascism were now unhappy at being asked to fight anti-fascists instead 151 -was discredited as it became clear that most of the troops with whom Citrine had spoken hated ELAS and its tactics. Benstead, for his part, contributed an article along similar lines to his union's paper. 152 Two points need to be made here. The first is that there can be no doubt that Citrine had been intended to come to these conclusions. In particular, he was fed information by the British Embassy in Athens which could only push him in one direction. The Embassy had made a priority of ensuring that Citrine and his party were taken to Peristeri, for example, and continued to send him information -including translations of Communist attacks on himeven after he had returned to Britain. 153 Peter Weiler criticizes Citrine strongly for allowing himself to be so manipulated. 154 He may be right to do so, but this matters less, in the context of this paper, than the fact that Citrine's reactions were, to a large extent, ones that could be (which now controlled that journal) to try to scare rebels into line. 157 But ironically, the conduct of Churchill during the Greek crisis, which had threatened to divide the party, ultimately helped to unite it. It reminded Labour party members from Attlee downwards of those features of both Churchill and the Conservative party that were worth defeating; and the only way in which Labour was likely to be able to do that was by closing its ranks and uniting in the face of the common enemy. As Greece began to look less of a moral crusade and more a matter of shades of grey, it rapidly lost place to the powerful iconic images which were But Labour's crisis over Greece had not arisen due to Communist pressure, and it was not because of an easing of that pressure that it came to an end. Rather, it was a combination of events in Greece with the choices and actions of party leaders, managers and activists that helped to achieve that closure. There was virtually no mention of, let alone argument about, Greece at the May 1945 party conference, and the party's Speaker's Handbook for the 1945 general election did not mention the country at all. 161 By then, there were other issues at stake.
V
Labour's Greek crisis passed almost as rapidly as it had arisen. But its effects were not merely transient. Its concrete results were not, perhaps, of enormous significance, but it is arguable, at least, that it was of some assistance to the Labour left, in three ways. First, it probably eased the passage of the Reading resolution on nationalization at the 1944 party conference, by removing the possibility of key union delegations being persuaded to toe the leadership line, and reducing the chances of its being remitted to the NEC as the latter requested.
Secondly, it reminded the party leadership that it must not depart too far from the party's basic principles, or compromise too far with the rest of the Coalition. Indeed, in amply demonstrating some of the less appealing aspects of Churchill (so far as Labour was concerned) it contributed still further to the stiffening of the party's resolve against continuing the Coalition. And, finally, it also marked a stage in Bevan's own progress towards the cabinet room as Minister of Health in the Attlee government. In mid-1944 Bevan had come close to being expelled from the party over his opposition to DR1AA. Now, he was becoming a key figure, in tune with the feeling of much of the party's rank and file, a fact confirmed by his election to the NEC in December 1944. Despite continuing spats between him and the party leadership, Bevan could now not be easily ignored. 162 But, far more important than all that, Labour's crisis over Greece illuminated a number of important features of both the Labour party and the wider left during the last winter of the war, but also more generally. It was significant because it showed how a foreign policy issue could impact very seriously on the Labour party if the circumstances were right (and especially with the party conference falling as it did). It demonstrated Labour's continuing concerns about the Communist party and the disruptive potential of its cries for 'progressive unity'. Ultimately, however, it also showed the limitations that there were on grassroots influence over the party leadership, the difficulties of sustaining rank-and-file pressure, and the potential that there was for the party's bosses to manage discontent. In these respects, little, if anything, had changed since the later 1930s. The impact of Greece owed almost everything to a unique concatenation of circumstances. Once that began to break down, the issue's salience was rapidly diminished. Although there were to be echoes of the crisis later in the decade, over Greece itself in 1946 and also over issues such as the Nenni telegram in 1948, they would prove easier for the party managers to handle than the events following the Dekemvriana. 163 The crisis over Greece suggests, even so, that the Labour party's mood in the last winter of the Second World War was rather febrile. This was not a party burgeoning with self-confidence: in some ways, it was clearly troubled by the prospect of the end of the war, and realized that it faced difficult times ahead. But it was also a party that contained enough people with the will and ability to try to overcome problems, and not simply succumb to them. Labour was not emerging from the war without weaknesses, but it did have one vital political asset, perhaps the most vital of all -an overriding will to win power. arouse argument, debate and condemnation within the party. 164 Yet the levels of anger, disputation and fervour which arose as a result of the 'second round' of the Greek Civil War in 1944-45 were never to be repeated. That was because, at root, the extent of Labour's crisis over Greece in that last wartime winter was at least as much about the future of Labour as it was about the present and future of Greece. As Jim Griffiths said to Churchill on 15 January 1945, '[i]t was immediately the situation in Greece, but it is much more than that'. 165 University of Exeter ANDREW THORPE
